When do crises create opportunities for presidents to act unilaterally?
Categories are qualitative descriptions from the published article; bar lengths or effect magnitudes are not inferred.
Beyond the abstract: the argument, study design, evidence, and limits of inference.
The study distinguishes foreign-policy crises, economic crises, natural disasters, and epidemic outbreaks. Treating all extraordinary events as a single category would obscure how urgency, expected leadership, and political constraints differ by the policy situation a president faces.
Foreign-policy crises provide the largest reported opportunities for expanding unilateral presidential action. Economic crises and most natural disasters have little or no comparable impact. Epidemics represent a smaller exception. The paper also reports that a president facing institutional constraints or lacking political skill and will may still gain an opening during a foreign-policy emergency.
An opportunity to act unilaterally is an empirical political condition. It should not be confused with a change in formal constitutional authorization. The article brings crises into the analysis of institutional power while rejecting the claim that every emergency produces equivalent expansion.
Research basis: Young, Unilateral Presidential Policy Making and the Impact of Crises, Presidential Studies Quarterly 43(2), 328–352 (2013).
The published findings distinguish political opportunities for unilateral action by crisis category; this is not a claim that every emergency expands constitutional authority.
| Crisis type | Reported relationship to unilateral action |
|---|---|
| Foreign-policy crises | Largest reported opening |
| Epidemic outbreaks | Smaller effect |
| Economic crises | Little or no comparable effect |
| Most natural disasters | Little or no comparable effect |
The labels summarize the article qualitatively, without claiming effect sizes that are not reproduced here.
The event type matters in addition to a president's ordinary constraints.
The article describes foreign-policy opportunities even for otherwise constrained presidents.
The exercise of unilateral power and its constitutional justification are distinct questions.
Young, Unilateral Presidential Policy Making and the Impact of Crises, Presidential Studies Quarterly 43(2), 328–352 (2013).
The findings describe patterns in a historical empirical study, not a legal claim that formal constitutional powers change automatically during an emergency. Detailed model specifications should be checked in the published article.
Young, Presidential Studies Quarterly 43(2), 328–352 (2013).
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