Can Charles Tilly's famous claim that war makes states withstand a comparative quantitative test?
Beyond the abstract: the argument, study design, evidence, and limits of inference.
The paper joins war records from George Kohn’s Dictionary of Wars with the State Antiquity Index of Bockstette, Chanda, and Putterman. It constructs historical evidence across approximately 0–1600 CE, extending the inquiry beyond the European cases that shaped Charles Tilly’s account. Recorded conflict is a count rather than only a yes/no classification, preserving differences in the intensity of historical exposure.
If rulers must prepare for repeated conflict, they have incentives to organize resources, armies, transport, taxation, recordkeeping, and territorial administration. Durable government develops when repeated coercive tasks demand institutions that persist beyond one campaign. The claim is not that any act of violence automatically creates a state.
The reported models associate greater warfare with stronger state institutions. Geographic position and foreign occupation also matter; neighboring conflicts may create incentives to strengthen capacity even where a polity is not itself fighting. Comparative historical support for the theory does not settle all causal steps, especially because ancient conflict and state capacity are reconstructed from uneven records.
Research basis: Young, Testing Tilly: Does War Really Make States?, Social Evolution & History 21(1), 65–89 (2022).
The empirical contribution is to assemble an extended comparative test rather than merely illustrate an influential proposition with a few European cases.
| Research component | How it is studied | Important boundary |
|---|---|---|
| Warfare | Recorded conflict counts over approximately 0–1600 CE | Surviving historical records vary by period and region |
| State development | Historical State Antiquity Index | Indirect measure of institutional capacity |
| Comparison | Polities in Europe, Africa and Asia | Institutions and record coverage are not identical |
| Additional conditions | Location and foreign occupation | Possible alternative sources of state capacity |
The article finds a positive warfare–state-development association and evidence that geographic position and foreign occupation matter. It does not identify the causal effect of a single war.
Preparing and paying for war can require extraction, provisioning, records and logistics.
Extending the comparison across regions puts the generality of Tilly's theory under greater empirical pressure.
Conflict and institutions are reconstructed historical variables, and pathways to capacity can vary.
Young, Testing Tilly: Does War Really Make States?, Social Evolution & History 21(1) (2022).
Historical records are incomplete and uneven across regions; both warfare and early institutional capacity require approximating variables. The relationship supports a comparative historical argument but cannot by itself establish every causal step between war and state-building.
Young, Social Evolution & History 21(1), 65–89 (2022).
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